Central bank independence and the design of fiscal institutions /

We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Castellani, Francesca
Corporate Authors:	IMF Institute, International Monetary Fund
Other Authors:	Debrun, Xavier
Format:	Book
Language:	English
Published:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, c2001 [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001 Washington, D.C. : 2001
Series:	IMF Working Papers ; Working Paper No. 01/205 IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/205 IMF eLibrary IMF working paper ; WP/01/205
Subjects:	Banks and banking, Central > Econometric models Fiscal policy > Econometric models Inflation (Finance) > Econometric models Monetary policy > Econometric models Account deficits Aggregate demand Budget constraint Budget law Central bank Discretionary fiscal policies Discretionary monetary policies Discretionary monetary policy European monetary union Expansionary fiscal Fiscal Policy Fiscal actions Fiscal adjustment Fiscal adjustments Fiscal arrangements Fiscal authorities Fiscal authority Fiscal balance Fiscal constraints Fiscal contracts Fiscal costs Fiscal criteria Fiscal decisions Fiscal deficit Fiscal discipline Fiscal framework Fiscal impulse Fiscal institutions Fiscal instrument Fiscal instruments Fiscal measures Fiscal policies Fiscal policy coordination Fiscal policy instruments Fiscal powers Fiscal regime Fiscal restraints Fiscal rules Fiscal stability Fiscal strategies Fiscal variables Independent monetary authorities Inflation Inflation-targeting Intermediate monetary target Loose monetary policy Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) Monetary arrangement Monetary arrangements Monetary authorities Monetary decisions Monetary economics Monetary expansion Monetary fund Monetary institutions Monetary instrument Monetary integration Monetary policies Monetary policy Monetary stability Monetary stances Monetary target Monetary union Monetary unions Money market Money supply Optimal monetary policy Policy Coordination Policy Designs and Consistency Policy Objectives Primary deficit Primary fiscal deficit Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance Public debt Public deficits Public expenditure Public finance Public finances Public spending Spending cuts Tax cut Tax policy Tax rates Taxation Banques centrales > Modèles économétriques Inflation > Modèles économétriques Politique fiscale > Modèles économétriques Politique monétaire > Modèles économétriques Banking Banks and Banking Banks and banking, Central Central Banks and Their Policies Central bank autonomy Deflation Expenditure Expenditures, Public Fiscal policy Macroeconomics Monetary Policy National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General Price Level Prices Public Finance Public finance & taxation Belgium Grenada United Kingdom Electronic books

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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Call Number:	HG3810.I45 no.WP/01/205

Central bank independence and the design of fiscal institutions /

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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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