Democratic accountability, deficit bias, and independent fiscal agencies /

Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on "fiscal councils" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is f...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Debrun, Xavier (Author)
Format:	Book
Language:	English
Published:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2011 Washington, D.C. : 2011
Series:	IMF Working Papers ; Working Paper No. 11/173 IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2011/173 IMF eLibrary IMF working paper ; WP/11/173
Subjects:	Banks and banking, Central > Econometric models Budget deficits > Econometric models Fiscal policy > Political aspects > Econometric models Budget balance Budget constraint Budget constraints Budget deficit Budget deficits Budgetary policy Central bank autonomy Central bank Deficit Discount rate Excessive deficits Fiscal Policy Fiscal affairs department Fiscal affairs Fiscal agencies Fiscal agency Fiscal authority Fiscal contract Fiscal council Fiscal deficits Fiscal discipline Fiscal frameworks Fiscal institutions Fiscal performance Fiscal policy decisions Fiscal policy rules Fiscal profligacy Fiscal rule Fiscal rules Fiscal stance Fiscal transparency Inflation Intermediate monetary target Monetary aggregates Monetary fund Monetary institutions Monetary policy Monetary target National fiscal rules Policy Coordination Policy Designs and Consistency Policy Objectives Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance Public debt Public finances Structure and Scope of Government Tax revenues Taxation Banking Banks and Banking Budget Systems Budget planning and preparation Budget Budgeting & financial management Budgeting Central Banks and Their Policies Central banks Debt Management Debt Debts, Public Deflation Fiscal policy Macroeconomics National Budget National Deficit Surplus Price Level Prices Public Finance Public finance & taxation Public financial management (PFM) Sovereign Debt Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government Belgium United Kingdom Electronic books

Table of Contents:

Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. An Illustrative Model of Fiscal Policy; A. Objectives and Constraints; B. Benchmark Equilibria; III. Institutional Solutions to the Deficit Bias: the Central Bank Analogy; A. From Central Bank Independence; B. ... to Independent Fiscal Institutions; C. Conclusion and Moving Forward; IV. Democratic Accountability and Independent Agencies; V. Concluding Remarks; References; Footnotes

Democratic accountability, deficit bias, and independent fiscal agencies /

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