Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions
Annotation
Main Authors: | Castellani, Francesca (Author), Debrun, Xavier (Author) |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Book |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Washington :
International Monetary Fund
Dec. 2001
|
Subjects: |
Similar Items
-
Central bank independence and the design of fiscal institutions /
by: Castellani, Francesca
Published: (2001) -
Democratic accountability, deficit bias, and independent fiscal agencies /
by: Debrun, Xavier, et al.
Published: (2011) -
Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies
by: Debrun, Xavier
Published: (2011) -
The discipline-enhancing role of fiscal institutions : theory and empirical evidence /
by: Debrun, Xavier
Published: (2007) -
The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: Theory and Empirical Evidence
by: Debrun, Xavier, et al.
Published: (2007)